

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 HA-05 AID-05 /084 W
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O 141647Z JUN 78 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7463
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAPE TOWN 1185

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECDEL; BRUSSELS FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, WA, AO
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: LUANDA SUMMIT RESULTS

REF: (A) STATE 150127, (B) USUN 2427, (C) DAR ES SALAAM 2501,
(D) LUSAKA 2078,

1. WE AGREE REFS (A) AND (B) THAT, RATHER THAN RELY
SOLELY ON NYERERE AND OTHER FRONTLINE SOURCES, WE SHOULD
NAIL DOWN SWAPO'S LATEST POSITION DIRECTLY WITH NUJOMA AND
HIS ASSOCIATES. THOUGH, AS MAY BECOME DESIRABLE, WE CAN
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EXPLORE INFORMALLY WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS SOME OF THE
RESULTS OF LUANDA AS THEY EMERGE FROM OTHER SOURCES, FORMAL
FOLLOW-UP WITH THE SAG WILL REQUIRE THE GREATER CERTAINTY
OF WORD DIRECTLY FROM SWAPO ITSELF.

2. IN THE MEANTIME, WE SUGGEST FOR CONSIDERATION THE
FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS BASED ON THE INFORMATION

WE HAVE SO FAR GAINED ABOUT LUANDA.

3. WALVIS BAY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN ADOPT THE STANCE SWAPO WANTS US TO TAKE ON WALVIS BAY WITHOUT DOING GRAVE DAMAGE TO OUR EFFORTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. FOR THE FIVE NOW TO STATE THAT THEY CONSIDER WALVIS BAY "AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA" WOULD BE TAKEN HERE AS A GROSS BREACH OF FAITH. FOR THE TIME BEING, AT LEAST, WE APPEAR TO HAVE SOMETHING IN THE NATURE OF A PROVISIONAL MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON THE QUESTION. THE SAG WILL STAND FIRM ON ITS POSITION IN THE BELIEF THAT THE FIVE WILL NOT SEEK TO BRING THE ISSUE INTO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL BUT WILL ULTIMATELY EXPRESS THEMSELVES ON THE FUTURE OF WALVIS BAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE SUSPECT THAT THE SAG IS REASONABLY WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE OF OUR UNDERTAKINGS TO THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO IN THIS MATTER. IN PRUDENCE, AS WE ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AN APPROACH WHICH THE FRONTLINE AND SWAPO CAN ACCEPT, WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SAG WILL PROMPTLY LEARN OF ANY CONTEMPLATED CHANGE IN OUR POSITION.

4. FOR THE PRESENT, IN DISCUSSING WALVIS BAY WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE FIVE CAN AND SHOULD STAND ON WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID (CAPE TOWN 1115, USUN 2251 AND 2233). IN OUR VIEW, WE HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED AT THE MOMENT WHEN IT IS ADVISABLE TO INFORM THE SAG MORE PRECISELY ABOUT
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HOW WE ENVISION PROCEEDING ON THIS ISSUE. EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF OUR INTENTIONS, CONFRONTING THE SOUTH AFRICANS OPENLY AND DIRECTLY WITH THOSE INTENTIONS COULD WELL IMPEL THE SAG TO RESPOND UNHELPFULLY AND PREMATURELY IN THE WRONG CIRCUMSTANCES-- I.E., BEFORE THE POINT OF SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL IS REACHED.

5. LOCATION OF SA RESIDUAL FORCES. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROPOSITION COMING OUT OF LUANDA IS THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE RESIDUAL SADF FORCE BE LOCATED SOMEWHERE SOUTH OF WINDHOEK. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE NOT IMPRESSED BY SWAPO'S HAVING DROPPED THE DEMAND THAT THE RESIDUAL FORCE BE LOCATED IN KARASBURG. BOTHA AGAIN MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO THE FIVE YESTERDAY (CAPE TOWN 1175) THAT THE SAG IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO CHANGES IN THE PROPOSAL IT HAS ACCEPTED. WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD IN THE LAST ANALYSIS STICK RIGIDLY TO ITS INSISTENCE AGAINST ANY KIND OF CHANGE IN THE PROPOSAL, THE RELOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE WOULD BE A MAJOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICAN EYES AND UNACCEPTABLE. IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, FACE-SAVING, AND MOST IMPORTANT, THE MORALE OF THE ANTI-SWAPO

(NOT NECESSARILY PRO-SAG) POPULATION, WHICH THE SAG WILL ASSERT
WOULD BE ENTIRELY DEMORALIZED BY SUCH RELOCATION.

6. OF THE OPTIONS SET OUT IN USUN 2427, WE BELIEVE
OPTION 1--REOPENING OF THE PROPOSAL--SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. OPTION 3 IS BURDENED BY THE
CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES POINTED OUT BY USUN. OPTION 2
SEEMS IN ANY EVENT TO BE THE BEST PLACE TO START. ONCE
WE HAVE NAILED DOWN THE SWAPO POSITION WITH REASONABLE
CERTAINTY, WE COULD TEST WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE
CONCEPT OF AN AGREEMENT--CONDITIONED ON SWAPO ACCEPTANCE
OF THE PROPOSAL--TO FOREGO THE OPTION OF MAINTAINING UNITS
AT OSHIVELLO. SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, AS USUN NOTES, WOULD
NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE IN THE PROPOSAL. THOUGH IT WOULD GO
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ACTION IO-14

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FM AMEMBASSY CAPE TOWN
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DEPT PLEASE PASS SECDEL; BRUSSELS FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

TNLY A MINIMAL DISTANCE TOWARD MEETING THE FL/SWAPO POSITION, IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE GESTURE AND A CONCESSION WHICH HAS A SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE IN THAT IT WOULD REMOVE THE SADF ENTIRELY FROM OVAMBOLAND. WE HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE AT ALL INCLINED TO AGREE TO SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, BUT WE BELIEVE IT NOT BEYOND THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY, AND, THEREFORE, WORTH EXPLORING.

7. OFFSHORE ISLANDS. IT IS CURIOUS THAT NYERERE DID NOT MENTION SWAPO'S CLAIM TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AS PART OF ITS CLAIM TO WALVIS BAY. THE ONLY WORD WE
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HAVE HAD COMES FROM MARK CHONA (REF D). THE CLAIM, HOWEVER, IS TO BE EXPECTED AND WHEN IT COMES TO LIGHT, IT COULD INDUCE A STORMY SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS VIEW THE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISLANDS AND THE ADJACENT TERRITORIAL SEA (E.G., SEABED MINERALS, FISHING, GUANO, AND SEALING). ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, HOWEVER, THE SAG MIGHT WELL VIEW INJECTION OF THE ISLANDS QUESTION AS AN ENTIRELY NEW CONDITION FOR SETTLEMENT AND AN INADMISSABLE CLAIM TO GENERALLY RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY. THE SETTLEMENT EFFORT COULD BE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THIS ISSUE.

8. WE THINK WE SHOULD FIND AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO INFORM THE SAG WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT LUANDA SWAPO ADVISED THE FL IT INCLUDES THE ISLANDS IN ITS CLAIM TO WALVIS BAY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NAMIBIA. WE SUGGEST WE TELL THE SOUTH AFRICANS WE ARE ADVISING THEM SO THEY WILL NOT BE SURPRISED WHEN THE CLAIM SURFACES AND IN THE URGENT HOPE THEY WILL NOT REACT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS AT WHAT MAY BE A MOST CRUCIAL MOMENT. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD VIEW THE ISLANDS QUESTION IN THE SAME LIGHT AS WE DO WALVIS BAY AND ASSURE THE SAG WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO BRING IT INTO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL.

9. TACTICS. AS WE EXPLORE THE GROUND ON THESE MATTERS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST TO PROCEED ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. ONE OF OUR PRIMARY PROBLEMS WILL BE TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO EXERCISE CARE AND RESTRAINT. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO STRESS TO THE SAG THAT, WHILE THE RESULT OF THE LUANDA SUMMIT LEAVES IMPORTANT DIFFICULTIES TO BE

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OVERCOME, SWAPO HAS COME A LONG WAY FROM ITS INITIAL
POSITION AND FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTAND WAS ITS AIM PRIOR
TO LUANDA TO REOPEN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON SEVERAL MAJOR
POINTS; THAT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN, BUT THE PROSPECTS APPEAR
TO US TO BE IMPROVING.

EDMONDSON

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